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Correction of Deficiencies Shown by Analytic Shortcomings in  
the Period Before Outbreak of Hostilities in the Middle East--

October 1973

1. The Directorate of Intelligence conducted an extensive review of its organization, procedures, and analytic processes following its failure adequately to warn of the imminence of hostilities in the Middle East last October. This was an internal inquiry, independent of the post-mortem conducted by the IC Staff for the intelligence community as a whole. The purpose was to determine what lay behind the unsatisfactory performance of the Directorate so that remedial action could be undertaken.

2. The survey determined that institutional and procedural factors did not contribute significantly to shortcomings in our analysis in the weeks that preceded the outbreak of hostilities. The lack of a suitable forum for a continual, lively interchange of ideas among analysts was noted, however, and it is felt that the NIO system which has since been instituted will go a long way toward correcting this deficiency. Certain institutional rigidities in the Watch Committee/NIC structure and processes were also noted, and these have since been addressed by both OCI and the IC Staff in proposals for bringing these procedures up to date.

25X1C 3. The principal reason for failure to provide adequate warning had to do with an almost universally held "mind-set" on the part of analysts and supervisors alike. It was a failure in judgment born of excessive dependence [REDACTED] and long exposure to Middle East tensions, exercise activity, and potential hostilities which, since 1967, had failed to materialize. There was insufficient challenge to the prevailing view that since an Egyptian military adventure would be suicidal it would not be tried. Sadat, it was felt, still had political options to play out. While these things are matters of judgment which are not usefully corrected by

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organizational or procedural changes, they are clearly matters for which line supervisors are responsible. The lesson learned is that complacency will not again prevail but will be challenged every step of the way.

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